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We study two principal mechanisms suggested in the literature to correct the serial correla-
tion in hedge fund returns and the impact of this correction on ﬁnancial characteristics of their
returns as well as on their risk level and on their performances. The methods of Geltner (1993),
its extension by Okunev & White (2003) and that of Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004) are applied
on a sample of 54 hedge fund indexes. The results show that the unsmoothing leaves the mean
unchanged but increases signiﬁcantly the risk level of hedge funds, whether the risk is measured
in terms of the return standard-deviation or the modiﬁed VaR. Funds’ absolute performances,
measured by traditional Sharpe ratio and Omega index, decline considerably. By contrast, funds’
rankings after the unsmoothing unexpectedly change slightly. However, some notable modiﬁ-
cations in ranks of several funds are observed. The necessary transparency of the management
practice requires that such a correction must be systematically done.
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11 Introduction
The extraordinary performances obtained by hedge funds during the last two decades,
especially during the long bullish period of the 90s, have made known to the general public
this new kind of funds. Before, they were open only to wealthy individuals; now, many
institutional investors tend to invest into them and one may expect very soon the coming
of "ordinary" investors.
The hedge funds are attractive because they seem to be able to have good performances
regardless of the general market conditions; in other words, they are uncorrelated with
the traditional assets. Thus, they increase the returns and/or reduce the risk, hence in-
creasing the diversiﬁcation effects of portfolios basically constituted with traditional assets.
Nevertheless, this characteristic is measured in the framework that returns follow a normal
distribution, independantly and identically distributed. Yet, many empirical studies tend
to prove that the hedge fund returns are very far from this assumption, which questions the
relevance of the meaning of these measurements. One of the most important issues is raised
by Asness, Krail & Liew (2001), Brooks & Kat (2002), Kat & Lu (2002), Okunev & White
(2003), Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004): the existence of a large serial correlation in hedge
fund returns, which basically implies that the risk of the hedge funds is underestimated.
As the risk and performance measurement of hedge funds is crucial, this research deals
with this issue in presence of a serial correlation in their returns. Moreover, we wish to
draw the attention of fund managers on this problem and on the possibility to correct it.
In this perspective, this paper is organized as follows. First, we try to explain why the
serial correlation does exist (section 2). Then we empirically show its existence (section 3).
We present in section 4 two corrective methods which are applied on a sample of hedge
fund indexes in section 5. Section 6 compares statistical characteristics of "smoothed" and
"unsmoothed" returns. Section 7 analyzes the consequences on the performance measure-
ment. We conclude in section 8.
2 Ambiguous nature of the serial correlation in hedge fund re-
turns: natural or intentional?
The serial correlation in hedge fund returns seems to have two causes; one "natural" reason
due to the illiquidity of the assets held by the hedge fund portfolios and one "intentional"
reason due to the fund manager’s compensation scheme.
22.1 Illiquidity of assets
One of the hedge funds’ speciﬁcities is to hold either illiquid assets or assets whose pricing
is difﬁcult to assess, like non-quoted assets in private equity, stocks of "distressed" compa-
nies, some stocks quoted in emerging markets, real estate, etc. According to a 2004’s study
by the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), 20% of these assets held
by hedge funds are difﬁcult to price! According to Waters (2006) and Kentouris (2005), these
percentage can reach 50%, even 100% in the case of some strategies like Fixed Income Ar-
bitrage, Convertible Arbitrage, Distressed Debts, Emerging Markets and Mortgage-Backed
Securities. According to these two authors, the hedge funds’ managers believe that this
lack of information on these assets creates opportunities for proﬁts. Since a market price is
not available or available irregularly, subjectivity interferes for the valuation of the net asset
values (NAV) of the fund, subjectivity either from the manager or from the specialized bro-
kers who can be asked for this task1. In such cases, the fund managers do not deliberately
try to smooth the NAV, this "subjective" pricing induces a serial correlation in their returns.
2.2 Inﬂuence of the managers’ compensation scheme
Hedge funds have a very different compensation scheme of their managers than the tradi-
tional funds. The manager receives "incentive fees" which are generally 20% of the excess
returns relative to a benchmark; these incentive fees are subjected to the "high-water mark",
the highest net asset value obtained. It means that the manager has ﬁrst to recover his
losses relatively to this highest value before receiving the incentive fees. During the recov-
ery period, he receives only "management fees"2. Third implicit feature of the compensa-
tion scheme: the incentive fees percentage is computed on the net asset managed; in other
words, its amount is proportional to the fund’s size. It is obvious that there is a huge temp-
tation for some unscrupulous managers to use their illiquid and their "subjectively priced"
assets to manipulate the computation of their NAV and, then, their returns3. Even if one
may believe that the majority of managers do not "manipulate" the NAV, the smoothing of
returns is helped by the lack of regulation, the lack of legal obligations to publish NAV, the
detailed content of portfolios and to be audited.
To sum up, the serial correlation of hedge fund returns is partially "natural" (uninten-
tional) due to the pricing problem on the non-quoted assets held, and partially "intentional"
due to the manager’s personal motivation to optimize his returns over several periods. But
this above "smooth" assertion is made much more brutal by Andrew Lo – who is ﬁnance
1It should be stressed that specialized brokers do not give the same estimate. For instance, according to
Lhabitant (2004), the valuation in december 2000 of Collateralized Mortgage Obligations given by ﬁve brokers
had a range of 6 to 44%!
2Some contracts include a "hurdle rate" which is the minimum performance to be obtained in order to
receive incentive fees.
3This phenomenon of accounting manipulation has already caused the bankruptcy of 3 hedge funds, Man-
hattan, Ballybunion and Volter (Ineichen 2000).
3professor at the MIT but in the meantime, manager of a hedge fund – who says "Most
hedge fund managers are good, honourable people. But there are probably some engaged
in unsavoury practices."4.
3 Evidence of serial correlation in hedge fund returns
3.1 American literature review
Several studies show the evidence of serial correlation in hedge funds’ returns — Asness
et al. (2001), Brooks & Kat (2002), Kat & Lu (2002), Okunev & White (2003) et Getmansky,
Lo & Makarov (2004).
Examing 10 CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indexes, Asness et al. (2001) found that regress-
ing hedge fund returns on the actual return and three lagged returns of the market portfolio
results in a beta (the true beta is the sum of the four estimated betas) which is much higher
than the beta obtained without market’s lagged returns. Besides, the estimated alpha in the
latter case is positive while in the former case, it becomes non signiﬁcantly negative. This
ﬁnding implies that neglecting the smoothing chacracteristic leads to an underestimation of
market risk exposed by hedge funds and thus to an overestimation of the managers’ ability.
Their analysis according to market conditions, bull or bear markets, shows that hedge fund
managers are more concerned to smooth their poor returns than their good ones, which
conﬁrmes the presence of the managed price practice.
Brooks & Kat (2002) examined the statistical characteristics of 48 hedge fund indexes
and observed a highly positive serial correlation of order 1 in almost all series. As a result
of this, the risk measured by the standard deviation of returns is downwardly biased, and
the Sharpe ratio is thus downwardly biased. This result is then corroborated by Kat & Lu
(2002) and Okunev & White (2003).
In an empirical study conducted on a sample of 12 hedge funds, Lo (2002) noticed that
the serial correlation in monthly hedge fund returns can overestimate the Sharpe ratio by
up to 65%, which modiﬁes dramatically fund rankings based on this performance measure.
Later, Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004) demonstrated mathematically that smoothing
returns does not affect the mean return but does decrease the variance, thus decreases the
beta and increases the Sharpe ratio. By means of a theoritical model, the authors showed
that a serial correlation of orders 1 and 2 (67% of order 1, 33% of order 2) in monthly returns
causes a decrease of 67% in beta and an increase of 73% of the Sharpe ratio.
In short, the serial correlation detected in hedge fund returns casts doubt on the ro-
bustness of previous ﬁndings on hedge funds’ low risk (small standard deviations), low
correlation with traditional assets (small betas) and thus ideal portfolio diversiﬁers.
4cf. "Is your hedge fund manager too smooth?", Institutional Investor, November 2002, N°11, p.9.
43.2 Empirical evidence
3.2.1 Data
We use the hedge fund indexes produced by three databases: 13 indexes from CSFB/Tremont
(CSFB), 24 indexes from Hedge Fund Research (HFR) and 17 indexes from Greenwich-Van
(GV), thus a total sample of 54 "hedge funds". These indexes have two advantages. First,
they are the most used in the academic studies on hedge funds, which enables to compare
our results with the previous ones. Second, they are computed on a rather long time pe-
riod, which ensures that the computations are rather robust. Each index has 146 monthly
returns over the period from April 1994 to May 2006.
For comparison purposes, 5 indexes representing the traditional asset classes are se-
lected: S&P 500, Russell 2000, Wilshire Small Cap 1750, Lehman US Aggregate Bond and
Lehman High Yield. Except for the HFR and GV indexes, which come from their websites,
the others are obtained from Datastream.
3.2.2 Evidence of serial correlation in hedge fund returns
Table 1 presents the serial correlation coefﬁcients of these indexes. The empirical evidence
is impressive: 40 out of 54 indexes have serious serial correlation of order 1 (74% of the
sample) and 6 even have positive serial correlation of order 2. The statistical signiﬁcance of
the serial correlation is extremely strong since 75% of the coefﬁcients (30 out of 40 autocor-
related ones) are signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Very revealing are ﬁve of the six indexes which have a serial correlation of orders 1 and
2 - which can be said to be "over-smoothed". The three Convertible Arbitrage indexes and
the HFR Relative Value Arbitrage suggest that the serial correlation is "natural" and due to
the management technique used. Also there is the HFR Fixed Income High Yield: it holds
junk bonds non-quoted, which proves the problem arising from the pricing difﬁculties.
On the other hand, hedge funds holding traditional assets do not display any autocorrela-
tion. These are the strategies Short Selling (4 cases), Futures (2 cases), Macro (3 cases), GV
Agressive Growth, GV Income, etc.
Moreover, all the indexes of traditional assets used as benchmarks, including the Lehman
High Yield index, which often holds illiquid assets, have also no serial correlation. Their
coefﬁcients are generally negative and small in absolute value; all are statistically non sig-
niﬁcant. This result conﬁrms the hypothesis that serial correlation is a characteristic of
some and not all hedge fund strategies.
This ﬁnding is in line with the results obtained by Brooks & Kat (2002), Kat & Lu (2002)
et Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004). It shows that these returns must be "unsmoothed" in
order to measure their "true" risks and their "true" beneﬁts.
5Table 1: Autocorrelation coefﬁcients of the original return series (in %)
Indexes ρ1 ρ2 Indexes ρ1 ρ2
CSFB HFR (cont)
Convertible Arbitrage 56.0 *** 38.0 ** Macro 7.0 -2.0
Dedicated Short Bias 9.0 -5.0 Market Timing -0.2 8.0
Emerging Markets 29.0 *** 2.0 Merger Arbitrage 25.1 *** 16.0
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 29.0 *** 16.0 Relative Value Arbitrage 31.0 *** 21.0 **
Event Driven 33.0 *** 14.0 Sector 16.1 * 4.0
Event Driven Distressed 28.0 *** 13.0 Short Selling 8.0 -10.0
Event Driven Multi-Strategy 32.0 *** 15.0 GV
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 29.0 *** -2.0 Equity Market Neutral 22.0 *** 9.0
Fixed Income Arbitrage 38.0 *** 6.0 Event-Driven 27.9 *** 9.1
Global Macro 1.0 3.0 Distressed Securities 30.1 *** 9.1
Long Short Equity 14.0 * 4.0 Special Situations 25.3 *** 10.1
Managed Futures 4.0 -10.0 Market Neutral Arbitrage 42.3 *** 16.2
Multi Strategies 1.0 5.0 Convertible Arbitrage 55.4 *** 26.9 **
HFR Fixed Income Arbitrage 36.6 *** 17.0
Convertible Arbitrage 52.1 *** 23.0 ** Aggressive Growth -0.3 5.4
Distressed Security 42.5 *** 13.0 Opportunistic 16.0 * 9.8
Emerging Markets (total) 30.7 *** 7.0 Short Selling 12.3 -9.8
Emerging Markets (Asia) 36.5 *** 21.0 ** Value 17.0 ** -3.0
Equity Hedge 17.5 ** 7.0 Futures 4.3 -13.5
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 7.3 10.0 Macro 3.9 -3.5
EMN Statistical Arbitrage 20.4 ** 15.0 Market Timing 13.9 * 8.9
Equity Non Hedge 15.2 * -9.0 Emerging Markets 19.7 ** 9.0
Event Driven 26.6 *** 4.0 Income -0.5 4.2
Fixed Income (total) 29.6 *** 14.0 Multi-Strategy 18.6 ** 0.3
Fixed Income Arbitrage 34.1 *** 2.0 Meanψ 28.7 25.0
Fixed Income High Yield 32.7 *** 20.0 **
FoF Conservative 36.1 *** 17.0 MARKETS
FoF Diversiﬁed 33.3 *** 6.0 S&P 500 -4.0 0.9
FoF Market Defensive 7.0 3.0 Lehman US Aggregate -0.1 -0.1
FoF Strategic 28.3 *** 10.0 Lehman High Yield 13.0 -6.0
FoF Composite 31.3 *** 9.0 Russell 2000 3.0 -4.0
Fund Weighted Composite 20.7 *** 2.0 Wilshire Small Cap 1750 0.0 -2.0
The serial correlation of orders 1 to 10 have been computed. The index portfolios printed in italic are portfolios
without serial correlation. The 4 portfolios in bold are those which also have a serial correlation of order 5 or of
order 6. It should be noted that CSFB Global Macro and HFR Equity Market Neutral have a serial correlation
respectively of order 5 or of order 6.) * arithmetical average of the 40 autocorrelated indexes.
4 The unsmoothing of hedge fund returns
There are only two academic studies which suggest a practical solution to this problem of
serial correlation5. These two methods for correcting the hedge fund returns are brieﬂy
presented in the following section.
4.1 Method of Geltner (1993) and its extension by Okunev & White (2003)
Brooks & Kat (2002) and Okunev & White (2003) suggest to unsmooth the smoothed returns
in order to obtain a new corrected serie. For this purpose, they use a method developped
by Geltner (1993) to deal with the real estate markets. According to this method, the price
of the period t is often determined on the basis of the price of the previous period t − 1
5Two authors, Lo (2002) and Getmansky and al. (2004) suggest a way for calculating the Sharpe ratio when
the returns are not time independent (not idd). These two proposals are very simple to use but they only
correct the consequence of the serial correlation on the performance measurement. We prefer to deal with how
to suppress that phenomenon.
6because of the illiquidity of real estate assets. Hence, the smoothing structure (intentional or
not) of returns of a given period is formulated as follows: the observed (smoothed) return
Ro
t in t is a weighted average of its "true" return Rc
1,t in t (the inferior index 1 indicates that
returns are corrected for the ﬁrst time) and the previous observed (smoothed) return Ro
t−1:
Ro
t = (1− c1)Rc
1,t + c1Ro
t−1 (1)
with c1 the weighted coefﬁcient. The "true" return Rc








In fact, c1 is the root (smaller than 1) of a second-degree equation and given that the
equation (1) is an auto-regressive of order 1 [AR(1)], c1 is simply equal to the autocorrela-
tion coefﬁcient of the ﬁrst order:
c1 = ρo
1 (3)
Consequently, each observed return is corrected following the equation (2), in which c1











Later, Okunev & White (2003) generalized this method by using the same reasoning as
that of Geltner (1993) to correct serial correlations of higher orders than 1.
4.2 Method of Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004)
The method of Getmansky, Lo & Makarov (2004) (henceforth GLM) assumes that the ob-
served return in period t (Ro
t) is a weighted average of the "true" returns [Rc] over the most




t−1 + ... + θkRc
t−k (5)
with two conditions:
θj ∈ [0,1] , j = 0,...,k (6)
1 = θ0 + θ1 + ... + θk (7)
After some intermediate developments of the equation (5), the θ can be estimated by
the maximum likelihood technique. The smoothing index (measuring the smoothing level)
is equal to the sum of the squared θj, soit ξ = ∑
k
j ˆ θ2
j (by construction 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1). A small
value of ξ implies a high smoothing level, ξ = 1 indicates no smoothing.
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A recurring application of the formula (8) on the observed returns provides a serie of
corrected returns which is free of serial correlation.
In this method, the subtlety relies on the choice of the parameter k. According to GLM,
the non-convergence of the estimation procedure (maximum likelihood) and/or the (statis-
tically signiﬁciant) negativity of the ˆ θ can be viewed as a ﬁrst warning of a bad speciﬁcation
of the smoothing proﬁle (equation (5)). In this case, it is necessary to test another value of k6.
In addition, GLM mathematically demonstrate that (i) the mean return of the unsmoothed
returns stays the same as that of the observed returns (µc = µo), (ii) the variance of the




the Sharpe ratio of the unsmoothed returns is 1/c(s) times lower than that of the observed
returns (Shc = 1
c(s)Sho ≤ Sho, with c(s) = 1/ξ ≥ 1). Thus, our corrected (unsmoothed)
series must satisfy these three properties — which was the case.
This method is very attractive but nevertheless raises two problems, may be minor ones.
On the one hand, it is based on the assumption that observed de-meaned returns follow a
normal distribution. On the other hand, the estimate of the unsmoothed returns is "based"
on the ﬁrst return (if k = 1) or the ﬁrst two returns (if k = 2), these returns being said to
be "true" returns when these observed returns are, by nature, smoothed. This may create a
potential bias. However, in our case, we have 34 cases with k = 1 and 6 cases with k = 2
while each case has 146 returns to be corrected, so this bias should be minor7.
5 The unsmoothing process
After having measured the serial correlation level, the G-OW and GLM methods are con-
ducted.
Regarding the G-OW method, a ﬁrst correction is made according the equation 1.2 for
all the indexes which have a serial correlation coefﬁcient of order statistically signiﬁcant.
This process suppresses the serial correlation of all the indexes, including the 5 indexes
which have a signiﬁcant (at 5%) autocorrelation of order 2 and of which the coefﬁcient is
rather high in absolute value. The only exception is the index CSFB Convertible Arbitrage
for which, in order to suppress the serial correlation of order 2, one has been obliged to use
6Applying k = 2 to a sample of 909 individual hedge funds having from 61 to 133 monthly returns, GLM
obtained quite satisfactory results: the estimation procedure converges and all the ˆ θ are positive, except for
one.
7Nevertheless, we wonder if this would not be the reason why the corrections by the GLM method are
generally smaller than those made by the G-OW method, even if – as it will be seen below – these corrections
are very similar.
8the Okunev & White (2003)’s extension.
As fas as the GLM method concerns, its subtle point is to choose the "right" k. The
trial of k = 2 – which had been chosen by the authors – resulted in unsatisfactory results.
Consequently, we used k = 1 for the 34 series with an autocorrelation of order 1 and k = 2
for the 6 series with an autocorrelation of order 2. In all these cases, the optimization
process converges and the estimated thetas are positive and signiﬁcant.
Table 2: Smoothing proﬁles computed by the GLM procedure
Indexes ˆ θ0 ˆ θ1 ˆ θ2 ξ c(s) 1− 1
c(s)
CSFB Convertible Arbitrage 0.51 0.28 0.21 0.38 1.62 0.38
Emerging Markets 0.76 0.24 0.63 1.26 0.20
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 0.81 0.19 0.69 1.21 0.17
Event Driven 0.78 0.22 0.66 1.23 0.19
Event Driven Distressed 0.81 0.19 0.69 1.21 0.17
Event Driven Multi-strategy 0.79 0.21 0.66 1.23 0.19
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 0.76 0.24 0.63 1.26 0.21
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.72 0.28 0.60 1.29 0.23
Long Short Equity 0.89 0.11 0.80 1.12 0.11
HFR Convertible Arbitrage 0.54 0.31 0.16 0.41 1.57 0.36
Distressed Security 0.73 0.27 0.60 1.47 0.32
Emerging Markets (total) 0.77 0.23 0.65 1.25 0.20
Emerging Markets (Asia) 0.66 0.19 0.15 0.49 1.42 0.30
Equity Hedge 0.86 0.14 0.76 1.14 0.13
EMN Statistical Arbitrage 0.86 0.14 0.76 1.15 0.13
Equity Non Hedge 0.84 0.16 0.73 1.17 0.14
Event Driven 0.79 0.21 0.67 1.22 0.18
Fixed Income (total) 0.81 0.19 0.69 1.20 0.17
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.70 0.30 0.58 1.31 0.24
Fixed Income High Yield 0.66 0.20 0.14 0.50 1.42 0.29
FoF Conservative 0.77 0.23 0.64 1.25 0.20
FoF Diversiﬁed 0.75 0.25 0.63 1.26 0.21
FoF Strategic 0.80 0.20 0.68 1.21 0.17
FoF Composite 0.78 0.22 0.65 1.24 0.19
Fund Weighted Composite 0.83 0.17 0.72 1.18 0.15
Merger Arbitrage 0.82 0.18 0.71 1.19 0.16
Relative Value Arbitrage 0.69 0.18 0.14 0.52 1.38 0.28
Sector 0.87 0.13 0.78 1.13 0.12
GV Equity Market Neutral 0.83 0.17 0.72 1.18 0.15
Event-Driven 0.80 0.20 0.68 1.21 0.17
Distressed Securities 0.78 0.22 0.66 1.23 0.19
Special Situations 0.82 0.18 0.70 1.19 0.16
Market Neutral Arbitrage 0.72 0.28 0.60 1.29 0.23
Convertible Arbitrage 0.55 0.32 0.13 0.42 1.53 0.35
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.77 0.23 0.65 1.24 0.20
Opportunistic 0.88 0.12 0.79 1.13 0.11
Value 0.85 0.15 0.74 1.16 0.14
Market Timing 0.90 0.10 0.81 1.11 0.10
Emerging Markets 0.85 0.15 0.75 1.16 0.14
Multi-Strategy 0.84 0.16 0.73 1.17 0.15
Mean 0.65 0.20







j (ξ ∈ [0.1]) measure the smoothing level. A low ξ implies a high smoothing






j . GLM show that neglecting the
serial correlation will underestimate the variance ξ by three (σ2
o = ξσ2
c ) and overestimate
the Sharpe ratio by c(s) (Sho = c(s)Shc). (1 − 1
c(s)) is the correction coefﬁcient to be used to
obtain the "true" Sharpe.
Table 2 presents the results of the process for each index according the GLM method.
9The reader should be aware of the slight difﬁculty for interpreting the result, which should
be "inversely" read. Theta zero chapeau is the percentage of the true returns included
in the observed returns. Thus, more ˆ θ0 chapeau is small, more the observed returns are
smoothed. Theta 1 and theta 2 are the percentage of previous returns (return t − 1 and
return t − 2) which are included in the observed return (return t). η is the smoothing
index. The smaller η, the higher the smoothing level. c(s) is the correction coefﬁcient to
be applied to the observed Sharpe ratio (Shc = Sho
c(s)). In other words, the observed Sharpe
ratio is overestimated and should be diminished by 1− 1/c(s) in order to measure the true
Sharpe ratio. Our results show that 15 indexes of 40 have an average smoothing level since
the "smoothing index" ranges between 0.69 and 0.60, the mean being 0.65 – which means
for measuring the performances to lower the observed Sharpe ratio by 17 to 23%. These
results show that the smoothing average is rather strong!
Seven indexes constitute a "large – smoothed" group of which eta is smaller than 0.60.
Three of them are very noticeable, the three Convertible Arbitrage indexes (0.42, 0.41, 0.38).
The Sharpe ratio should be on average diminished by 36%. Conversely, 14 indexes con-
stitute "slight-smoothed" group of which eta is larger than 0.70. The less autocorrelated
are CSFB Long Short Equity with 0.85 and GV Market Timing with 0.81. The Sharpe ratio
should only be reduced by 10%.
The next procedure is to apply the estimated thetas into equation (8) in order to obtain
the "unsmoothed" returns. These unsmoothed returns are theoretically the true returns.
The next section presents the results.
6 Financial characteristics of "unsmoothed" returns
The following tables present two comparisons; on the one hand, the comparison between
the original "smoothed" series and the corrected "unsmoothed" ones; on the other hand, the
comparison between the results obtained under G-OW and GLM methods. The comparison
of the distribution parameters emphasizes the risk indicators.
6.1 Similarity of obtained mean returns
The results are clear: the mean returns computed on the unsmoothed series are strictly
identical in 18 cases (over 40 unsmoothed series)8. And the difference is only two units on
the second decimal for the 22 other cases9. This equality conforms with the mathemati-
cal demonstration by GLM proving that the smoothing has no inﬂuence on the observed
returns (and then on the expected returns for the future).
8In order to be short and because of the similarity, the ﬁgures on the mean returns are not presented here.
They are available upon request.
9To be completely safe, a Student test on the mean of the three distributions was made. As the standard
deviation is strictly equal, these means are statistically identical.
106.2 Strong increase of the risk
The hedge funds try to sell the idea that they are an asset with a reduced risk - hence, their
name of "Hedge". Our results, in line with the theoretical and empirical previous ones,
show that this image is wrong.
6.2.1 Large increase of the standard deviation10
The standard deviations of the unsmoothed series increase in average by 25% with the
GLM method and by the 37% with the G-OW one. More unsmoothed are the series, more
the increase in its risk. One ﬁnds again the 3 Convertible Arbitrage indexes for which the
"true" risk increases by 73% for HFR, 84% for GV and 117% for CSFB! Follwing them are the
two portfolios, Distressed Securities and Equity Market Neutral, each having an increase
of 57%. Otherwise, the majority of hedge funds have a true risk which is higher by 30% to
40% than the "ofﬁcial" risk, which is quite a large increase!
Table 3: Comparison of standard deviations before and after the unsmoothing
Indexes B G-OW GLM G-OW Indexes B G-OW GLM G-OW
vs B vs B
CSFB HFR
Convertible Arbitrage 1.4 3.0 2.2 117.3 Convertible Arbitrage 1.0 1.8 1.7 73.3
Emerging Markets 4.7 6.3 5.9 33.1 Distressed Security 1.5 2.4 1.9 57.2
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 0.8 1.1 1.0 34.1 Emerging Markets (total) 4.2 5.7 5.2 37.2
Event Driven 1.6 2.3 2.0 40.0 Emerging Markets (Asia) 3.6 5.2 5.0 46.5
Event Driven Distressed 1.8 2.4 2.2 32.4 Equity Hedge 2.6 3.1 3.0 19.3
Event Driven Multi-Strategy 1.8 2.4 2.1 38.6 EMN Statistical Arbitrage 1.1 1.4 1.3 23.0
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage 1.2 1.6 1.5 33.2 Equity Non Hedge 4.0 4.7 4.7 16.6
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.1 1.6 1.3 48.7 Event Driven 1.8 2.4 2.2 31.2
Long Short Equity 3.0 3.4 3.3 14.1 Fixed Income (total) 0.9 1.2 1.0 35.6
GV Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.1 1.6 1.5 42.6
Equity Market Neutral 1.2 1.5 1.4 25.0 Fixed Income High Yield 1.3 1.8 1.8 40.1
Event-Driven 1.7 2.3 2.1 33.2 FoF Conservative 0.9 1.4 1.2 44.4
Distressed Securities 1.4 1.9 1.7 36.3 FoF Diversiﬁed 1.8 2.5 2.2 41.3
Special Situations 2.0 2.6 2.4 29.4 FoF Strategic 2.6 3.5 3.1 33.6
Market Neutral Arbitrage 0.9 1.4 1.2 57.0 FoF Composite 1.7 2.3 2.0 38.0
Convertible Arbitrage 1.1 2.0 1.6 86.7 Fund Weighted Composite 2.0 2.5 2.4 23.2
Fixed Income Arbitrage 1.0 1.4 1.2 46.7 Merger Arbitrage 1.1 1.4 1.3 29.1
Opportunistic 2.9 3.4 3.3 17.5 Relative Value Arbitrage 0.9 1.2 1.3 37.3
Value 3.0 3.5 3.5 18.8 Sector 4.1 4.9 4.7 17.7
Market Timing 2.6 2.9 2.8 15.0
Emerging Markets 5.0 6.0 5.7 21.7
Multi-Strategy 2.3 2.7 2.6 20.7
Mean 2.0 2.7 2.5 37.2
Standard deviation 1.1 1.4 1.3 20.0
B: original series; G-OW: series unsmoothed following the G-OW method; GLM: series unsmoothed following the GLM
method; G-OW vs B: variation (in %) of standard deviations unsmoothed by G-OW relative to standard deviations of
original series (the correction providing the largest differences).
In order to have a formal proof, 80 Fisher tests on equality of variances have been made:
smoothed variances versus unsmoothed G-OW variances and smoothed variances versus
unsmoothed GLM variances. In all the cases, the equality of the two variances (observed
10We analyze the statistical properties of the unsmoothed and smoothed distribution of returns, we focus on
the standard deviation and not on the volatility.
11variances and corrected variances) is rejected at minimum 5%. The conclusion is clear-cut:
the hedge funds indexes present a risk level larger than the observed risk and their "true"
risk is at least 25% larger than their "ofﬁcial" risk. Since an index is a portfolio of individual
funds, it is obvious than some individual risks are dramatically larger.
The comparison of the two methods shows that the standard deviations corrected by
G-OW are larger than those computed by the GLM procedure (with only two exceptions
where they are equal). On average, the G-OW standard deviations are larger than 7.4%11 .
6.2.2 Lack of skewness effect
The third distributional parameter - skewness- has to be taken into account as a (minor) risk
parameter. Here, as for almost all the portfolios invested on stock exchange, the skewness
of the hedge funds indexes is negative: 31 cases for the unsmoothed skewness and 28 (over
40) for the smoothed ones. But, that skewness does not seem really relevant parameter,
the more so the unsmoothing improves the skewnesses: the average for the 40 smoothed
skewnesses is -0.91 while the average of the skewnesses is -0.76 for the G-OW unsmoothing
procedure and -0.81 for the GLM one12.
6.2.3 Heterogeneity of kurtosis
The fourth distributional parameter - kurtosis - is a risk parameter if the computed coefﬁ-
cient is positive13, it means (to put it very simply) that the probability for a krach, either
up or down, is larger than 5%. The distributions of hedge fund returns deﬁnitely have fat
tails: on average, the "smoothed" excess of kurtosis is 7.26 while that of the "unsmoothed"
is 7.11 according to G-OW or 7.20 according GLM. A formal Student test on these three
means concludes that the krach risk is identical for "smoothed" and "unsmoothed" returns.
But this similarity of the mean hides the presence of three groups very different in this
aspect. There are nine indexes with a very high kurtosis (according to GLM), larger than 10:
six between 10 and 20; especially three between 20 and 30 with GV Fixed Income Arbitrage
reaching 39. The second group is composed by a majority of 26 indexes having a kurtosis
(according to GLM) between 1 and 9. Finally, a small group of ﬁve indexes whose kurtosis
(according to GLM) is lower than 1 and which certainly have a "true" kurtosis equal to zero.
11But 40 Fisher tests show that this average difference of 7.4% is not signiﬁcant, the variances being statisti-
cally equal.
12A formal Student test shows that the two G-OW and GLM averages are statistically equal. The individual
results are shown in the appendix (table 10).
13A normal distribution has a kurtosis equal to 3. But, softwares generally compute the excess of kurtosis
(= k−3), so that the coefﬁcient is de-meaned on zero. It is the case of our computation (cf. appendix, table 10).
126.3 Increase of potential maximum loss
It seems interesting to study what can be the maximum loss that an investor in hedge
funds bears. The Modiﬁed Value-at-Risk (MVAR) proposed by Favre & Galeano (2002) has
the attractive property of taking into account the four parameters of return distributions,































with W portfolio value exposed to risk, µ = R mean return, σ,S et K standard deviation,
skewness and excess of kurtosis of returns respectively; zc critical value corresponding to
1− α signiﬁcance level (zc = −1.96 when α = 95%).
The results (see appendix, table 10) summarize the preceding results: MVAR according
to G-OW and GLM is systematically larger than that computed on the smoothed returns.
This shows the effect of the increase in standard deviations and that of the kurtosis (more
or less strong) and also asserts the probable lack of effect of the skewness, although it is
negative. The difference between the smoothed and unsmoothed MVAR ranges between
12% and 98% according to G-OW and between 5% to 52% according to GLM. It is clear that
the smoothing of the returns of some hedge fund strategies hides their risk. It should be
noticed that the G-OW procedure gives MVAR values on average larger by 10% than those
computed by the GLM method.
To summarize, the comparison of statistical parameters and their ﬁnancial implications
between the smoothed and unsmoothed return series gives three basic results:
• First, the smoothing of returns (either natural or intentional) reduces the three param-
eters measuring the total risk of a fund: the standard deviation, the skewness and the
kurtosis - the principal decrease being that of the standard deviation.
• Consequently, this decrease dramatically hides the "true" risk level of some hedge
fund strategies. The smoothing creates real illusion, especially for the riskiest strate-
gies.
• Finally, the choice of the unsmoothing method (G-OW or GLM) seems neutral, the
results being very similar: the same direction and the same numerical values.
7 Consequences of the unsmoothing on hedge fund performances
The ultimate aim for correcting the hedge fund returns is to measure their "true" perfor-
mances.
137.1 Decrease of the absolute performance
Two performance measures are used: the Sharpe ratio (Sharpe 1966) because of its large
popularity and the Omega ratio (Keating & Shadwick 2002) which has the advantage to
take into account the whole return distribution without making any assumption neither on
the distribution law, nor on the investor’s utility function.
The computation of the Sharpe ratio for the smoothed and unsmoothed series is very
traditional: average standard deviation of the relevant return distribution and the risk-free
rate of interest is that of the US 3-month Treasury bill14. The formula for the Omega ratio
is the following:









The Omega coefﬁcient is the ratio of the gains (Ig) and the losses (Il) relative to a thresh-
old τ, which is freely determined by the investors; the gains and losses are weighted by
their occurrence frequency. τ is also the US 3-month Treasury bill. The higher the Omega
ratio, the larger the performance.
The smoothed Sharpe ratios show a very attractive image for the hedge funds since the
general average is 1.16 and, even four strategies exceed 2. Curiously, there are some "losers",
especially the strategies on the Emerging Markets which gets only 0.30. Of course, the ratios
of the unsmoothed returns are much less ﬂattering since the G-OW method decrease these
ratios on average by 25% and the GLM method by 20%. For example, the average of the 40
ratios decreases, according to G-OW, from 1.16 to 0.86 with a maximum of 1.58 (instead of
2.16) and a minimum of 0.18 (instead of 0.28).
Table 4: Changes in absolute performances for the 40 smoothed indexes
Panel A: Sharpe ratio
Absolute value Variation (%)
BS BNS G-OW GLM G-OW GLM
Mean 1.16 0.64 0.80 0.84 -24.9 -20.4
Standard deviation 0.53 0.54 0.42 0.46 8.8 10.4
Max 2.16 1.27 1.58 1.74 -8.2 -5.7
Min 0.28 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -48.2 -51.0
S&P 500 0.49
Panel B: Omega index
Mean 2.42 1.65 1.83 1.97 -18.6 -12.6
Standard deviation 0.99 0.60 0.59 0.74 9.5 6.0
Max 4.72 2.54 3.49 3.87 -4.8 -3.8
Min 1.17 0.75 0.75 0.75 -41.0 -28.4
S&P 500 1.36
BS: values of original series; BNS: values of non-smoothed original series;
G-OW: values smoothed by the G-OW method; GLM: values smoothed by
the GLM method; all variations (in %) are computed in comparison with the
value of the original series.
Table 5 shows in a synthetic way the differences in the distribution of the Sharpe ratios




14between the three series: the smoothed, that unsmoothed by G-OW and that unsmoothed
by GLM. The shift to the lower class is obvious15.
Table 5: Distribution of Sharpe ratios for the 40 smoothed and unsmoothed indexes
Sharpe ratio Original G-OW GLM
Sh ≤ 0.5 4 7 8
0.5 < Sh <1 14 18 16
1≤ Sh < 1.5 12 13 12
1.5 ≤ Sh < 2 6 2 4
Sh ≥ 2 4 0 0
Total 40 40 40
Average of Sharpe 1.16 0.86 0.91
The Omega shows the same shift to the lower class when the G-OW method is used. But
these shifts are less noticeable with the GLM procedure. That method keeps in the highest
class (ratios larger than 3) six out of the seven funds of which the unsmoothed returns did
belong16.
7.2 Signiﬁcant changes in hedge fund rankings
In fact, what matters to the managers is less the absolute value of the performance coefﬁ-
cients than their ranking among their peers. Hence, the consequences of the unsmoothing
on rankings have to be analyzed. For that, an important methodological point should
be raised: the 14 indexes which had no serial correlation and then which have not been
unsmoothed have to be reintroduced in the sample. This inclusion is important in two
respects; theoretically because one can expect the non-smoothed funds to be systemati-
cally disadvantaged by the rankings; practically because the performance measurements
are made on all the funds belonging to a given strategy.
7.2.1 Strange similarity of the global ranking
Unexpectedly, the ﬁve rankings obtained are very similar. The correlation coefﬁcients be-
tween the ranks are very large, as shown by table 6 below17.
A much stronger difference was expected. Nevertheless, three things are worth to be
noticed. On the one hand, the necessary inclusion of the non-smoothed indexes brings a
light increase in differences. Secondly, the ranking similarity is somewhat smaller when
the G-OW is used. Finally, the two corrective methods bring very similar results. Which
means that the unsmoothing, whatever the procedure used, has no actual consequences on
15The readers can notice (even if it is not our topic) that to obtain a Sharpe ratio of 0.86 (or 0.91) can be
considered as very good relatively to a portfolio of US stocks represented by S&P 500 which obtains only half
of that, 0.49.
16The detailed results concerning the Omega ratio are available upon request.
17Detailed rankings are available upon request.
15Table 6: Spearman correlation coefﬁcients between the performance rankings
Smoothed indexes only Smoothed indexes
and NON smoothed
Sharpe Omega Sharpe Omega
Original vs G-OW 0.963 0.964 0.942 0.934
Original vs GLM 0.952 0.983 0.947 0.97
G-OW vs GLM 0.994 0.991 0.994 0.986
the relative rankings of hedge funds. Because of the important ﬁnancial implications of the
fund rankings, it needs to be examined in more details.
7.2.2 An improved distribution of non-smoothed indexes among the quartiles
It is interesting to analyze the changes among quartiles when the funds have been un-
smoothed. This analysis is made in the following manner. The funds are ﬁrst ranked in a
decreasing order according to their performance ratios on the smoothed and unsmoothed
returns. This ranking is then divided in four groups with now 54 indexes; the two ﬁrst
quartiles include 13 indexes each while the two last quartiles group 14 indexes.
The table 7 below tends to conﬁrm the intuition according to which the non-smoothed
hedge funds are systematically disadvantaged.
Table 7: Quartile ranking distribution of the indexes according to the Sharpe ratio (before
and after the unsmoothing according to the G-OW method)
Q*1 Q*2 Q*3 Q*4 Total
Smoothed indexes
Before the unsmoothing 13 9 9 9 40
Before the G-OW unsmoothing 10 11 10 9 40
in % 25 27,5 25 22,5 100
Non-smoothed indexes
Before the unsmoothing 0 4 5 5 14
After the G-OW unsmoothing 3 3 3 5 14
in % 21 21 21 36 100
* Q denotes quartiles. The total sample includes 54 indexes, among
them 40 display a serial correlation and are thus corrected.
Before the correction, none of the 14 non-smoothed indexes belongs to the ﬁrst quartile,
which groups the best performing funds. After correcting the smoothed indexes with the
G-OW method, the non-smoothed indexes proﬁt from a general upper shift, with specially
three indexes – CSFB Multi Strategies, HFR Equity Market Neutral and HFR Market Timing
– which reach the ﬁrst quartile. On the contrary, the last four funds in the rankings based
on the smoothed series are still the last ones after the correction. This ﬁnding shows that
two kinds of non-smoothed indexes do exist: the "good" ones which are disadvantaged
if there is no correction procedure; and the "second-rate" ones which do not proﬁt from
the correction of the smoothed competitors. The detailed analyses either on the rankings
16according to the Omega ratios or according to the GLM procedure bring the same results.
To sum up, the ﬁrst effect of the corrective procedure is to improve the rankings of the
non-smoothed indexes and correlatively to degrade the rankings of the smoothed indexes.
7.2.3 Signiﬁcant changes in performance classes
Except to be either "the ﬁrst" or "the last" ones, the manager wishes to belong to the "good"
ones, meaning to be in the ﬁrst class. The empirical way to measure that is to look into the
changes between the quartiles. Table 8 presents these changes between quartiles according
to the corrective method used and according to the performance ratio.
Table 8: Changes between quartiles for the different rankings of 54 indexes
Panel A: Sharpe
G-OW GLM
smoothed Non-smoothed smoothed Non-smoothed
Nbr % Nbr % Nbr % Nbr %
Shift to a LOWER quartile 5 12.5 0 0.0 4 10.0 0 0.0
Maintain in the same quartile 34 85.0 10 71.4 33 82.5 11 78.6
Shift to a HIGHER quartile 1 2.5 4 28.6 3 7.5 3 21.4
Equality of ranks 2 5.0 4 7.4 6 42.9 3 21.4




smoothed Non-smoothed smoothed Non-smoothed
Nbr % Nbr % Nbr % Nbr %
Shift to a LOWER quartile 5 12.5 0 0.0 4 10.0 0 0.0
Maintain in the same quartile 33 82.5 11 78.6 35 87.5 12 85.7
Shift to a HIGHER quartile 2 5.0 3 21.4 1 2.5 2 14.3
Equality of ranks 7 17.5 3 21.4 6 15.0 3 21.4
Variation of ONE place 9 22.5 0 0.0 13 32.5 1 7.1
(upwards or downwards)
The previous rank correlation coefﬁcients are veriﬁed: 81% of the total sample (44 in-
dexes out of 54) or 82.5% of the smoothed indexes (being unsmoothed) remain in the same
quartile (whatever the corrective procedure used). But this also means that 12.5% of the
smoothed funds (9% of the sample) are down-graded while 21% of the non-smoothed funds
are over-graded according to the Omega ratio and 29% according to the Sharpe ratio.
It seems to us that to prove that 19% of the funds suffer from the "unsmoothing" is
an important result from an academic as from a practical points of view. Indeed, the
performances result in money inﬂows, and, as shown in section 1 these inﬂows inﬂuence
the manager compensation scheme. It is thus important to have an idea about the changes
in rankings.
177.2.4 Example of individual variations of performance rankings
Tableau 9 presents some examples of the most signiﬁcant (upward or downward) changes
of fund’s ranks on the basis of Sharpe ratio obtained from returns corrected by the G-OW
method.
Table 9: Examples of rank changes on the basis of the Sharpe ratio and the G-OW
correction method
Original G-OW Difference
Cases having the highest downward variations
HFR Convertible Arbitrage 11 26 -15
CSFB Convertible Arbitrage 29 42 -13
GV Convertible Arbitrage 2 11 -9
CSFB Event Driven 17 24 -7
HFR FoF Conservative 22 29 -7
Cases having the highest upward variations*
HFR Market Timing 25 13 +12
GV Income 26 15 +11
CSFB Multi Strategies 20 10 +10
HFR Equity Market Neutral 16 7 +9
Indexes in italic are non-smoothed ones. * The three indexes which follow
these four indexes and win 7 places are all non-smoothed indexes.
8 Concluding remarks
In this research, we have used two methods which eliminate the serial correlation found in
hedge fund returns and which recreate "unsmoothed" returns: the procedure proposed by
Geltner (1993), its extension by Okunev & White (2003) and that developed by Getmansky,
Lo & Makarov (2004). Our empirical analysis is based on a sample of 54 hedge fund indexes
representing hedge fund portfolios. Our main conclusions concern the consequences of the
unsmoothing and of the method used for the unsmoothing on the ﬁnancial characteristics
of the hedge fund returns and on their performance measurement. Several ﬁndings are
noteworthy.
Firstly, the hedge fund ﬁnancial characteristics after the unsmoothing process are strongly
modiﬁed. If the mean return does not change, the risk level increases considerably. Accord-
ing to the corrective method, the standard deviation increases on average by 25% and even
by 37%; the skewness does not seem to have an impact contrarily to the excess of kurtosis
which shows that a large majority of hedge funds bears an "abnormal" risk of a downward
crash. These two last empirical evidences are a original contribution to the literature which
has only dealt with the standard deviation of returns and which has neglected the third
and fourth moments of the return distribution.
The consequence is that the hedge fund performance measured by traditional ratios
considerably decreases after unsmoothing, decrease which is on average 20%, even 25%
18according to the method and to the performance ratio used. If a cursory look can give the
feeling that the rankings are not really modiﬁed, more detailed analysis shows that 20%
of have a change in rankings. Moreover, there are several cases of strong "down-grading"
and of strong "over-grading" - these later correcting the disadvantage borne by the non-
smoothed indexes when they are compared to the smoothed ones.
Finally, the choice of the unsmoothing procedure seems neutral, the results being very
similar when they are not identical. One can only note that the G-OW is "stronger" in the
down-grading of the performances, certainly because this method diminishes more signif-
icantly the standard deviation than does the GLM method. Since this G-OW procedure
seems easier to understand and easier to implement, we believe it could be chosen by
practionners concerned.
These three sets of results have important implications for the hedge fund managers
as for the regulating authorities. We conﬁrm the fact that partially for natural reasons
and partially intentional ones, returns of several hedge fund strategies are smoothed. Not
taking into account this characteristic means to underestimate strongly the risk level borne
by investors and to overestimate the performances of these funds. In a time when everyone
is correctly concerned by "ethic behaviour" and by "good governance", the transparency
demands the true risk level of hedge funds to be measured/ connu and the moral requires
the managers to be "rated" on the basis of their true performances.
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20Table 10: Characteristics of unsmoothed indexes: skewness, kurtosis, MVAR and normality test
Skewness Excess of Kurtosis (= K −3) MVAR Shapiro-Wilk Test
Indices Absolute Value Variation (%) Absolute Value Variation (%) Absolute Value Variation (%) B G-OW GLM
B G-OW GLM G-OW GLM B G-OW GLM G-OW GLM B G-OW GLM G-OW GLM
CSFB
Convertible Arbitrage -1.36 -0.59 -1.20 -57 -11 3.09 5.12 4.10 66 32 4.24 8.38 6.44 98 52 0.90 0.93 0.92
Emerging Markets -0.71 -0.96 -1.00 34 40 4.83 5.43 5.53 12 14 12.79 17.43 16.45 36 29 0.93 0.93 0.93
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) 0.32 0.21 0.26 -35 -18 0.43 0.94 0.77 120 80 2.38 3.01 2.73 27 15 0.99 0.98 0.98
Event Driven -3.59 -3.84 -3.83 7 7 25.57 29.65 29.69 16 16 6.67 9.29 8.16 39 22 0.76 0.75 0.75
Event Driven Distressed -3.04 -3.18 -3.16 5 4 19.93 22.83 22.38 15 12 7.37 9.80 8.80 33 19 0.80 0.79 0.80
Event Driven Multi-Strategy -2.63 -2.62 -2.68 0 2 17.14 18.41 19.22 7 12 6.75 9.27 8.28 37 23 0.82 0.83 0.83
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage -1.26 -1.17 -1.23 -7 -2 6.52 7.11 7.49 9 15 3.99 5.18 4.93 30 24 0.92 0.92 0.91
Fixed Income Arbitrage -3.34 -1.72 -2.12 -49 -37 19.00 11.00 12.46 -42 -34 3.95 5.43 4.80 37 22 0.76 0.84 0.83
Long Short Equity 0.23 0.14 0.18 -39 -20 3.99 3.56 3.62 -11 -9 7.33 8.28 8.01 13 9 0.94 0.95 0.95
HFR
Convertible Arbitrage -1.01 -0.36 -0.84 -64 -16 2.05 3.15 3.28 54 60 3.31 5.01 4.88 51 48 0.94 0.96 0.95
Distressed Security -1.72 -1.70 -1.77 -2 3 9.81 10.96 11.12 12 13 5.61 8.44 6.97 51 24 0.90 0.89 0.89
Emerging Markets (total) -0.96 -1.18 -1.21 23 26 5.05 5.59 6.02 11 19 11.90 16.36 15.05 38 26 0.94 0.93 0.93
Emerging Markets (Asia) 0.21 0.22 0.24 5 18 0.59 0.23 0.09 -61 -84 7.37 10.34 9.83 40 33 0.98 0.99 0.99
Equity Hedge 0.28 0.29 0.33 5 18 1.91 1.52 1.65 -21 -13 6.23 7.09 6.81 14 9 0.98 0.98 0.98
EMN Statistical Arbitrage -0.30 -0.26 -0.28 -13 -8 0.35 0.04 0.10 -87 -70 2.95 3.44 3.26 17 10 0.99 0.99 0.99
Equity Non Hedge -0.50 -0.42 -0.41 -14 -18 0.66 0.45 0.42 -32 -36 10.11 11.40 11.39 13 13 0.98 0.99 0.99
Event Driven -1.30 -1.12 -1.13 -14 -13 5.63 5.20 5.26 -8 -7 6.08 7.51 7.06 24 16 0.93 0.94 0.94
Fixed Income (total) -1.31 -0.99 -1.18 -25 -10 5.16 3.99 4.77 -23 -8 3.00 3.68 3.40 23 13 0.91 0.93 0.92
Fixed Income Arbitrage -3.32 -2.03 -1.69 -39 -49 18.96 11.45 8.81 -40 -54 4.00 5.31 4.75 33 19 0.73 0.84 0.87
Fixed Income High Yield -2.12 -2.10 -2.16 -1 2 10.20 12.59 12.72 23 25 4.41 6.23 6.27 41 42 0.86 0.86 0.86
FoF Conservative -0.54 -0.76 -0.72 42 34 4.12 4.56 4.33 11 5 2.94 4.10 3.56 39 21 0.94 0.94 0.94
FoF Diversiﬁed -0.09 -0.33 -0.27 281 213 4.76 4.21 4.49 -11 -6 4.75 6.60 5.92 39 25 0.93 0.94 0.94
FoF Strategic -0.44 -0.49 -0.42 11 -4 4.53 4.15 4.34 -8 -4 7.09 9.19 8.30 30 17 0.94 0.95 0.95
FoF Composite -0.25 -0.44 -0.37 76 47 4.61 4.19 4.43 -9 -4 4.62 6.22 5.58 35 21 0.94 0.95 0.95
Fund Weighted Composite -0.52 -0.49 -0.47 -5 -9 3.24 2.75 2.85 -15 -12 5.81 6.83 6.55 18 13 0.96 0.97 0.97
Merger Arbitrage -2.02 -1.81 -1.85 -10 -8 9.31 8.72 8.66 -6 -7 3.97 4.86 4.51 22 14 0.88 0.89 0.89
Relative Value Arbitrage -2.62 -2.47 -2.51 -6 -4 18.52 17.97 17.93 -3 -3 3.90 5.08 5.26 30 35 0.84 0.84 0.84
Sector 0.24 0.27 0.30 13 23 3.07 2.67 2.81 -13 -9 9.70 10.98 10.59 13 9 0.95 0.96 0.96
GV
Equity Market Neutral 1.25 1.08 1.18 -13 -5 4.65 4.62 5.01 -1 8 2.81 3.46 3.23 23 15 0.92 0.92 0.92
Event-Driven -0.44 -0.17 -0.18 -62 -60 4.90 5.03 5.12 3 4 5.32 6.50 6.01 22 13 0.94 0.94 0.94
Distressed Securities -0.13 0.09 0.03 -170 -121 2.93 3.65 3.26 25 11 4.18 5.20 4.77 24 14 0.96 0.95 0.96
Special Situations -0.26 0.02 0.00 -106 -101 4.26 4.33 4.45 2 4 5.83 6.92 6.47 19 11 0.94 0.94 0.94
Market Neutral Arbitrage 0.33 0.70 0.56 113 70 0.97 1.20 0.67 23 -31 2.60 3.26 2.88 25 11 0.98 0.97 0.98
Convertible Arbitrage -0.85 0.09 -0.21 -111 -75 1.90 2.39 2.07 26 9 3.51 5.10 4.51 45 28 0.95 0.96 0.97
Fixed Income Arbitrage -4.54 -4.11 -4.52 -9 0 38.07 36.18 38.68 -5 2 4.43 6.37 5.29 44 20 0.68 0.68 0.67
Opportunistic 1.76 1.77 1.85 1 5 10.12 10.15 10.59 0 5 5.32 5.96 5.61 12 6 0.86 0.87 0.87
Value -0.35 -0.26 -0.25 -27 -28 1.38 1.05 1.12 -24 -19 7.89 8.91 8.77 13 11 0.98 0.99 0.99
Market Timing 1.01 0.87 0.92 -14 -8 3.04 2.60 2.78 -14 -9 4.92 5.73 5.48 16 11 0.94 0.95 0.94
Emerging Markets -0.26 -0.37 -0.38 44 49 3.15 3.20 3.28 2 4 12.31 15.07 14.37 22 17 0.96 0.95 0.95
Multi-Strategy -0.42 -0.35 -0.35 -17 -18 1.95 1.64 1.73 -16 -12 6.18 7.11 6.93 15 12 0.97 0.98 0.98
Mean -0.91 -0.76 -0.81 -6 -2 7.26 7.11 7.20 0 -2 5.71 7.36 6.82 30 20 0.91 0.92 0.92
Standard deviation 1.38 1.27 1.32 67 51 8.05 7.94 8.20 33 29 2.65 3.37 3.20 16 11 0.08 0.07 0.07
B: values of original series; G-OW: values of series unsmoothed by the G-OW method; GLM: values of series unsmoothed by the GLM method; all variations (in %) are computed in
comparison with the values of original series. Shapiro-Wilk Test is a normality test on return distributions. MVAR: Modiﬁed Value-at-Risk computed following the equation (9).
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